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Abstract
Drones are modern and sophisticated technology that have been used in numerous
fields. Nowadays, many countries use them in exploration, reconnaissance operations, and
espionage in military operations. Drones also have many uses that are not limited to only
daily life. For example, drones are used for home delivery, safety monitoring, and others.
However, the use of drones is a double-edged sword. Drones can be used for positive
purposes to improve the quality of human lives, but they can also be used for criminal
purposes and other detrimental purposes. In fact, many countries have been attacked by
terrorists using smart drones. Hence, drone detection is an active area of research and it
receives the attention of many scholars.
Advanced drones are, many times, difficult to detect, and hence they, sometimes,
can be life threatening. Currently, most detection methods are based on video, sound, radar,
temperature, radio frequency (RF), or Wi-Fi techniques. However, each detection method
has several flaws that make them imperfect choices for drone detection in sensitive areas.
Our aim is to overcome the challenges that most existing drone detection techniques face.
In this thesis, we propose two modeling techniques and compare them to produce an
efficient system for drone detection. Specifically, we compare the two proposed models by
investigating the risk assessments and the probability of success for each model.

ix

Chapter 1
Introduction
Drones recently positioned themselves as an effective multi-task weapon in
warfare, and nation states and armed groups have sought to possess them for their
capabilities to deliver painful blows to enemies at low cost.
Drones are complex technical systems that do not need a pilot inside. But they are
operated through a pilot located at the guidance station that controls the drone remotely.
The ground pilot is responsible for controlling it remotely, ensuring that it does not get into
any accidents, or interfering in emergency situations. The pilot must determine the drone's
route points, and then the drone directs itself according to these coordinates under the
guidance of its automatic flight system.
Drones are predicted to play main roles in future smart cities, through their use in
surveillance and protection systems, and for maintaining security. Although drones can be
used to improve daily lives, malicious organizations can use them to perform physical and
cyber-attacks on infrastructure, private/public property, and individuals. Air traffic
management (ATM) for unmanned systems (UTM) are essential for ensuring secure and
collision-free activity for all drone flight use-cases. Consequently, different methods of
identifying, monitoring and preventing potentially unwanted drone missions are of
paramount importance for monitoring and ATM systems.
1

Problem Statement
The high availability of small drones has raised the interest of different societal
actors, as remotely controlled drones can be used in various projects. The widespread use
of these technologies has generated several privacy/security and protection issues which
need be resolved through proper monitoring systems capable of dealing with these risks
(Bisio, Garibotto, Lavagetto, Sciarrone, and Zappatore, 2018). In the current days, drones
are becoming more hazardous and anyone could become a direct or indirect target. In order
to prevent these potential hazardous situations, this thesis proposes solutions to overcome
these issues.
Drones can perform their missions based on different technologies. Hence, the
drone detection systems have to be comprehensive enough to detect drones of any kind.
However, the current systems often have limitations in their ability to detect the several
types of drones with malicious missions. To exemplify this, we consider a radar system. In
such a system, any object that flies within the radar field is detected. Radiation is sent to
hit the object body and then the signal is returned to the source of the radar to determine
the object’s location. However, many drones are hard to detect and made up of materials
such as fiber that make signal reflection very difficult or impossible. Moreover, every
object that flies over a low range is difficult to detect through radar-based techniques. Also,
sometimes, it is hard to differentiate between birds and drones. Therefore, in the case of a
drone attack, our aim is to design a system to defend against the attacker drone.
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Research Motivation
Malicious actors out there seek to develop drones so that they are difficult to detect,
disable and neutralize their threat. To build a safer world, the good actors must work on
improving the techniques to detect, counter, and destroy the malicious-built drones.
Research Objectives
In order to achieve the goals of this research and address the identified problem, we
use a descriptive approach that includes a review of previous studies found in the literature
and the methods that relate to the topic of the research. Our research objective is to develop
detection systems that reduce the research problems and provide feasible ways to address
them. More specifically, we adopt some recent and powerful techniques in machine
learning such as deep neural networks (DNN). Moreover, we combine a classic detection
method that is based on radar with DNN to reduce false alarms as well as avoid missdetection. To this end, later we show the advantages of each system with comparison
between them to produce an optimal detection system.

Literature Review
Bisio et al. (2018) submitted a proposal for a Wi-Fi-based statistical fingerprint
method to drone identification, capable of detecting nearby drone malicious mission risks
even in the midst of hacking attempts. An observational efficiency test is provided and
shows that the approach could achieve strong outcomes of detection accuracy in several
real-life situations, with a significant real positive peak rate of 96%.
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Loke (2015) presented a study focused on the services and applications presented
by airborne computing infrastructure to mobile users. The study discusses many concepts,
for example drones-as-a-service and flying, fly-out infrastructure, as well as focuses on
data controlling and system configuration problems that are on an increasing growth. The
surveyed paper clarifies the behavior of large data sets emerging from these applications,
optimizing the design of airborne and ground infrastructure to provide the best Quality of
Service (QoS) and Quality of Experience (QoE), situation knowledge, usability,
performance routing, user interaction, and physical analysis drones (Loke, 2015).
Guvenc et al. (2020) studied technologies that rely on ambient radio frequency (RF)
signals generated from drones, radar systems, acoustic sensors, and computer vision
methods for recognition of malicious drone systems. Some experimental and early
simulation outcomes are presented on radar-based range approximation of drones, and
receding horizon tracking of drones. In addition, the study provided an overview of
corporate methods that are measured for exclusion of drones (Guvenc, Ozdemir, Yapici,
Mehrpouyan and Matolak, 2020).
According to Kaleem and Rehmani (2018) new suggested solutions coming from
research and development arena advocate for the introduction of onboard drone detection
systems. These solutions could make a link between the Monitoring Drone (MDr) and
Intruder Drone (IDr) concepts.
Drone Detection Methods
The surveyed literature identified different techniques for detecting and tracking
intruding drones, such as RF sensing (Nguyen et al., 2018), Wi-Fi sniffing (Bisio et al.,
4

2019), acoustic sensors (Guvenc et al., 2017), video surveillance (Sturdivant and Chong,
2017), and radar systems (Birch, Griffin, and Erdman, 2015). The following sections focus
on the latest methods used to detect drones in larger detail.
Video-Based Detection
Video-based detection uses both graphical and electrical camera sensors to
recognize moveable objects in the monitored environment. Generally, advertisement
cameras can achieve an operating range of approximately 350 ft., which leads to a quiet
desirable neighborhood of monitoring. This method uses characteristics like color, contour
lines, shapes, and edges to categorize a typical drone’s object as compared to other things
(Zhang et al., 2016).
Remote monitoring algorithms can also be used for evaluating elements over
consecutive frames (Ganti and Kim, 2016). This can help identify different objects with
identical shapes through their usual gestures, like drones and birds (for example,
differentiating between artificial drone motions vs. natural bird motions). Cameras
mounted on these systems are also very sensitive to the lighting conditions and require that
the target is in their line of sight to be able to detect flying objects. Furthermore, numerous
studies and research have contributed to the development of a system for the detection and
identification of drones from surveillance videos (Ganti and Kim, 2016; Wu et al., 2018).
Sound-Based Detection
Many recent studies and research have focused on the use of the voice detection
method to detect and identify drones through tools such as correlation analysis (Mezei and
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Molnar, 2016; Mezei, Fiaska, and Molnar, 2015). One of the leading methods that can be
used in detecting, recognizing acoustics, and distinguishing between drones and other
objects is the learning algorithm utilized in support vector machines (SVM) (Bernardini,
Mangiatordi, Pallotti, and Capodiferro, 2017). Nijim and Mantrawadi (2016) presented a
study to detect drones through their emission sounds. Other works used sound cameras and
direction of arrival (DOA) rating for classification and tracking of drones (Chang et al.,
2018; Busset et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2018).
Radar-Based Detection
Radar-based detection uses the electromagnetic principle of backscattering theory
for drone identification. The conventional radar method is based on the observation that
aircraft or flying objects typically show a broad radar cross-section (RCS). However, as it
was observed through the literature survey, most modern drones are mechanical
quadcopters, with a low RCS (Ritchie, Fioranelli, Griffiths, and Torvik, 2015). The main
disadvantage of this method depends on the construction materials, some of them having
dielectric characteristics close to air and resulting in little reflection back to the transmitter.
Therefore, the new studies employ updated forms of radar detectors that harness the power
backscattered from propellers and rotors.
To compensate for these limitations, many studies and researches have attempted
to use multi-static radars to analyze the signature of micro doppler of drones, and classify
drones with various payload size (Fioranelli, Ritchie, Griffiths, and Borrion, 2015).
Additionally, Drozdowicz et al. (2016) used frequency-modulated continuous-wave
(FMCW) radar to extract data on the scope, kind, range, and radial velocity of drones. In
6

addition, other methods were identified in the literature studied. Klare, Biallawons, and
Cerutti-Maori (2016) introduced a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) radar to create
256 virtual components to identify and track drones. The device can be used to determine
whether drones reside within a given range of angular cells. This radar-based method can
be implemented in a rather portable format, so a motion detection radar (MDR) can also
be deployed onboard (Moses, Rutherford, and Valavanis, 2011).
Moses, Rutherford, and Valavanis (2011), proposed a model for a lightweight XBand radar system for identify drones via their Doppler signatures. Moreover, Mendis,
Randeny, Wei and Madanayake (2016) suggested a model to automatically detect and
classify three drones in a laboratory environment based on a radar sensor. Solomitckii,
Gapeyenko, Semkin, Andreev, and Koucheryavy (2018), designed a system for detecting
drones by exploiting 5G millimeter bands as radars. Lastly, Saqib, Khan, Sharma, and
Blumenstein (2017), and Unlu, Zenou, and Riviere (2018), relied on computer vision
detection approaches to detect drones in the vicinity of birds.
Radio Frequency Detection
The radio frequency (RF) based detection systems rely on the fact that drones use
RF signals to connect with the ground station. Drone networking protocols typically are
carried by the same also used for Wi-Fi communications, especially in the range 2.4 and 5
GHz. In addition, drones fitted with cameras typically relay a video stream during the same
wireless channel to their control system.
According to Witschi et al. (2016), morphological frequency-domain filtering is
used to formulate an algorithm for the identification of UMTS, LTE, and drone contact
7

signals in detrimental conditions. RF identification has a very long operational range
covering more than 1400 ft. An identified limitation of this method is that the target
detection rate is highly dependent on the transmission energy and response of the detector.
More recently, novel methods that depend on software-defined radio (SDR) solutions have
been suggested. A different approach is proposed in (Yue et al., 2018), where authors
recommend a distributed system for tracking the location and estimated direction of
unwelcomed drones through combining SDR transmitters and wireless acoustic sensors.
An overall summary of passive drone monitoring is presented in (Fu et al., 2015),
where authors also establish a portable universal radio minor software design depending
on SDR to simulate drones in various scenarios. Nguyen et al. (2018), considered a passive
cost-effective RF sensing drone detection system. In addition, Zhang et al. (2018)
suggested a drone detection based on RF sensing. Nguyen et al. (2016) described a
preliminary investigation of active/passive RF methods for the recognition of drones. In
the last two works surveyed here (Abeywickrama, Jayasinghe, Fu, and Yuen, 2017; and
Azari et al., 2018), DOA approximation and surveillance drones established RF-based
methods for drone optimization.
Wi-Fi-Based Detection
Many operational drones are designed and developed to be piloted via the Wi-Fi
connection, allowing professionals to monitor the drone using their own intelligent devices.
These types of systems often typically include a First-Person View (FPV) video capability
to transmit the feed directly to the intelligent device monitor from their integrated camera.
In previous studies, the concept of using the Wi-Fi signal to detect the presence of
8

unauthorized drones is explored by few submissions. The basic idea is to catch drone power
and video transfer packet streams using a Wi-Fi channel network packet capture. This
method is incorporated in specific drones designed to identify specific types of nearby
equipment (Liu et al., 2015).
Nonetheless, these strategies are generally based on prior knowledge of the
remotely controlled aircraft, such a as data about the Organizationally Unique Identifier
(OUI) vendor used to classify the sender/receiver of unique packets (Kamkar, 2017). In
this context, Bisio et al. (2018) proposed a novel method, where they suggest a model based
on the study of the Wi-Fi traffic's statistical fingerprints to classify drones’ position in the
monitored environment. The same lead author, in two newer publications (Bisio, Garibotto,
and Lavagetto, 2018; Bisio et al., 2019), conducted research on the Wi-Fi sniffing
dependent drone identification through statistically analyzing Wi-Fi traffic for drone
fingerprints. Other works such as Peacock and Johnstone (2013) and Terron (2017), carried
out studies on the identification and disarming of drones relying on Wi-Fi signals. Last
public work reviewed here is Sun et al. (2017), where a power-efficient system was
implemented. The system is capable of identifying and removing video feeds from Wi-Fibased drones, which could be an efficient mitigation solution for privacy-aware systems.
Models of Drones
This section discusses different drone types that were identified through the review
of the literature and have been used in the past for a variety of missions.
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1- Global Hawk RQ-4A
Schelp, Corea, and Jeffries (2003) mention that these flying objects were used
during the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to expand the coverage area of the
Jstars fleet. This aircraft flew for the first time in the year 1998 at a high altitude for a long
time Baizert et al. (2006). The drone can take off with a payload of 11,600 kg.

Figure 1.1 Global Hawk RQ-4A Kvint (2012)

A heavyweight fighter, the RQ-4A is equipped with a single turbine fan and was designed
to operate in a remote monitoring fashion from a low to medium threat environment. It is
31.5 meters long, its wingspan has 35.4 meters, its back and forth range is 25,000 km, has
lasted 36 hours at an altitude of 65,000 feet, and has a beneficial load of 910 kg. This
unmanned plane can take high-resolution pictures of large areas, works in all climatic
conditions, day and night, and flies with its own capabilities or underground control. The
10

plane can provide 24-hour observation with a radius of 1,200 nautical miles and can
conveniently hold sensors weighing up to 900 kg. These aircraft collect data with electronic
optical cameras and infrared cameras for stationary, not video, imaging and radar with
image detailing, at an effective range of more than 100 nautical miles.

2- Boeing X-45
Fulghum (2003) provided the information that this plane flew for the first time in
May 2002 and was scheduled to enter service in 2008. The plane is 39 feet long and has a
full load weight of 2.45 kg. Its flight speed reaches 0.85 Macs, a ceiling height of 4,000
feet, and a maximum range of 1,300 nautical miles.
The aircraft can be armed with multiple types of smart bombs. This plane is
characterized by invisibility, and its wingspan is 10.3 meters, its length is 8.08 meters, its
height is 2.94 meters, and has a complete balance of 5528 kg and a range of 600 km. A
newer model of this aircraft is currently undergoing a comprehensive development under
the name X-45c, which is about five meters wider than the first model and is intended to
accommodate a tonnage of approximately two tons, with the possibility of providing
additional fuel tanks that raise its range to 2400 km. The aircraft and its flying control
equipment exhibit the latest high-tech being one of the most advanced aircraft models.

11

Figure 1.2 Boeing X-45 Pike, J. (2014)

Wise (2003) discusses the possibility of providing the aircraft with fuel during the
desalination, which would push its advantages to be closer to those of traditional combat
aircraft. Boeing intends to make the aircraft capable of carrying eight small ordnance, each
weighing 113 kg, that can be loaded with the entire set of GPS target coordinates. The X45c program has recently been expanded to also include the possibility of conducting
electronic warfare and airspace operations.

3- Predator
The RQ-1 Predator drone flew for the first time in 1994. With a maximum resisting
time of 40 hours, it was able to keep in contact with the ground station within a radius of
750 km for a period of 24 hours. Its main technical specifications are: its length is 8.23
meters, its wing span is 14.84 meters, its useful payload is 200 kg, and it includes electronic
12

sensors, two color video cameras, a forward looking infrared (FLIR) system, an artificial
aperture radar SAR, and a GPS satellite data link. The aircraft can fly at altitudes up to
25,000 feet and can be equipped with laser mapping devices and two surface-to-surface
missiles (the armed aircraft model is called the MQ-1 code).
Predator aircrafts connect to the ground guidance station through a ground-based
information transfer link, or via a satellite link that is used when the aircraft is out of line
of sight. Using these connections, the remote pilots of the aircraft can monitor the missions
from ground-based locations and can perform up to 4-hour assignments from these remote
locations. Predator systems were used in the Afghanistan theatre of operations and have
been modified to be able to send target images directly to armed aircraft (Williams, 2013).

4- Gnat 750

Figure 1.3 Gnat, Leidy (2019)
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This drone flew for the first time in 1989 and can carry electro-optical or thermal
sensors. The drone can also be equipped with a SAR system. In 1994, United States
intelligence used it on several missions in its operations in the former Yugoslavia theatre
of operations. The drone weighs 520 kg and carries a useful load of 150 kg, can fly for 40
hours, and has an upper ceiling of 7600 meters (Ernst, 1994; Petrescu and Petrescu, 2012).

5- Neuron

Figure 1.4 Neuron, Donald, D. (2019)

The development of this French drone started in 2009 and was designed to be
pilotless and it must demonstrate the ability to perform the most demanding tasks in the
most severe conditions. The drone is fully integrated within the environment of the network
hubs warfare, as it must reach its target with the greatest degree of concealment through
the lowest radar fingerprint with infrared detection. The drone approaches the designated
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target from another source of information at subsonic speeds and can deliver its mission in
good conditions (Harris, Pfeiffer, Rubin, and Truman, 2015; and Kihlman and Engstrom,
2010).

6- Hunter RQ-5A

Figure 1.5 Hunter RQ-5A, Mons, de. (2017)

In 2005 the United States Army conducted its first experimental RQ-5A Hunter
pilotless drone called the Endurance Hunter. The range, usefulness, and carrying capacity
of the drone have been significantly expanded. This system combines a fixed-wing and
double-wing hull to form a new tail and a longer middle wing to form a drone that can
carry out missions of up to 30 hours at an altitude of more than 20,000 feet. The system
can carry various external sensors, communication systems and useful loads of weapons.

15

The wing was provided with harsh points capable of carrying loads such as weaponry and
also up to 110 liters of fuel to increase the drone's missions for an additional six hours.

16

Chapter 2
Drone Detection and Monitoring Methods
Drone Monitoring Equipment
Typically, there are four types of drone monitoring equipment:
1- Radio Frequency (RF) Analyzers
2- Acoustic Sensors (Microphones)
3- Optical Sensors (Cameras)
4- Radar
These types of monitoring equipment will be discussed in detail in the subsequent
sections.
Radio Frequency (RF) Analyzers

Figure 2.1 Radio frequency (RF), Rohde & Schwarz, (2017)
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Radio Frequency (RF) is one of the forms of electromagnetic energy, which
includes also gamma rays, X-rays, and light. The frequency number is the number of waves
that pass through a certain point in one second of any electromagnetic wave and is usually
expressed in measuring units called Hertz (Fernandes, 1989).
RF energy is used in communications, radio broadcasts, television, wireless phones,
pagers, police radio, space administration, and point-to-point links. Other uses of radio
frequency energy include microwave ovens, radar, industrial heaters, medical treatments,
military applications, and manufacturing plastic material (Fernandes, 1989).
Usually, radio frequency interference occurs, naturally or not. The interference is
the effect of unwanted wireless signals as a result of one or several factors, which affects
the receiving systems of communication devices, and leads to a decay in the specifications
of the required signal or the loss of information about the signal that is present if the signal
disappears other than when usually desirable. The interference radio frequency types can
result from any of the below phenomena or actions.
1- Natural phenomena that adversely affect the electromagnetic waves (Van Der Togt,
et al., 2008)
● Lightning
● Static electricity
● Thermal energy
● Solar sunspot
● Tornadoes
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2- Electrical and mechanical devices (Van Der Togt, et al., 2008)
● The effect of some components of electric lighting lamps (fluorescent). When
the components of the electric lamps do not work efficiently, they emit a spark
that results in a negative impact on the communications equipment.
● The effect of rotating motors emits spinning electromagnetic waves of random
frequencies that cause interference events on communication devices.
3- Wireless devices (Mehrabanzad, et al., 2010)
● Pictures of some devices violating the communication system.
● Interference as a result of using one channel from more than one user in the
same area.
● Interference from adjacent channels due to failure to observe the technical
standards.
● Interference due to inter-modulation due to failure to observe the technical
standards.
● Interference due to malfunctions of wireless devices.
● Overlap result overrun.
● Receiver overload.
● Wireless broadcast accompanying the original broadcast.
● Radio interference noise.
There are also some common types of radio interference:
1- Receiver overload.
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If a receiver is located near strong radiation transmission systems, the wireless
transmission issued by these systems negatively affects the specifications of the
zoom circuits in the receiver and thus leads to weak sensitivity and causes
harmful interference due to the arrival of intermodulation vehicles.



For transmitter signals to receiver antennas, there are ways to avoid this type of
interference (Nanni, 2003).

2- Wireless transmission accompanying the original broadcast (out of band).


All transmitters emit a transmitting power of the original frequency to be
broadcasted in addition to transmitting a capacity for the accompanying
frequencies of the original frequency, where the accompanying frequencies are
known to be outside the band.



Causes harmful interference to the receiver but can be reduced by using filters
or removing the transmitters causing these interferences to distant locations.
(Ru, Moseley, Klumperink, and Nauta, 2009).

3- Inter modulation product interference


If more than one communication system is installed on one antenna, or if there
are high-power communication systems close to each other, then the
frequencies of these systems will mix with each other; or the frequencies of
some of these systems will mix with the frequencies of the mixing circuits in
the nearby receivers creating new frequencies that can cause harmful
interference to the receiving systems.



There are ways to avoid this type of interference (Babcock, 1953).
20

Acoustic Sensors (Microphones)

Figure 2.2 Acoustic Sensors, Sahni (2014)

Acoustic sensors (microphones) capture ultrasound waves that exceed the
frequency of human-made sounds, and which are below the 20,000 Hz range. Ultrasound
waves are studied by a branch of physics known as ultrasonic. Acoustic sensors have many
applications in the fields of physics, chemistry, technology and medicine. They have many
and varied uses, as they are used in physics to determine the properties of materials such
as compressibility, elasticity, and specific heat ratios. They are also used in chemistry to
produce homogeneous emulsions as used in making photographic films, as well as for the
detection of cracks in plates and others.
Modern ultrasound generators generate waves with a frequency of up to a few
gigahertz, by converting high-frequency alternating currents into mechanical vibrations.
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These waves are usually detected using piezoelectric crystals or by light means, as the
diffraction of light can benefit by making these waves visible (Sessler, 1991).
The pickup picks up the ultrasound and converts it to electrical vibrations. Then the
Q1 and Q2 transistors amplify it, and it is moved to the integral circuit U1 and enters it
through the terminal 14. The integral circuit compares the phase between the captured
signal and the signal generated by the integral circuit whose frequency can be controlled
by the C9 fractionator and gives the circuit a frequency at junction 2. The transistor Q3
amplifies the difference signal, and the signal is transmitted through the transducer T1 to
the loudspeaker at the same frequency. (Ko, et al., 2009).
Ultrasound has been used for a long time to provide communications underwater
and to detect submersible objects beneath it, such as submarines, in so-called sonar devices,
which are radar-like devices, but they use ultrasound to perform their mission. Sonar
devices are essential devices to provide safety of marine navigation. (Blumstein, et al.,
2011). Sound acoustic sensors whose frequency is in the GHz field have been used to create
an audio “microscope” that can distinguish dimensions from the micron rank. Surface
waves whose frequency is in the ultrasound field known as Surface Acoustic Waves (SAW)
play an important role in electronic control equipment (Brandstein, and Ward, 2013).
Ultrasounds are distinguished from other waves by many characteristics, the most
important of which are (Lundgaard, 1992).
1- The inability of a person to distinguish them because they are beyond the human
auditory range.
2- They are characterized by high frequency without other waves.
22

3- They are one of the shortest waves in wavelength.
4- They have the ability to travel at a high speed.
5- Some animal species can easily recognize and benefit from them.
6- They carry a medium cost in development.
7- They can provide drone direction.

Optical Sensors (Cameras)

Figure 2.3 Optical Sensors Hinkle, S., et al. (2019)

Optical sensors (cameras) are a type of digital sensor. The optical sensors use light
to sense things. In the past, optical sensors were unreliable, because they used ordinary
light, and therefore they were affected by ambient light. This behavior can cause many
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problems, which could lead to unreliable data. The new optical sensors have been improved
and became more reliable.
All optical sensors work in almost the same way, as they use a light source
(transmitter) and a light detector (receiver) to sense the presence or absence of light
(Narayanaswamy and Wolfbeis, 2013). Typically, optical sensors use light-emitting diodes
as a type of light source. These diodes are used because of their small size, high strength
and efficiency, and because they can also be turned on and off at high speed and operate at
a narrow wavelength with good reliability. Optical diodes are also used in sensors in a
pulse style, by sending them to vibrations (ignition and extinguishing quickly). The ignition
time is very small compared to the extinguishing time, and therefore fluctuate for these two
reasons. The sensor will not be affected by the surrounding light, as it increases the lifespan
of the light source (Santos and Farahi, 2014).
The oscillating light is sensed by the light detector, and thus the detector captures
all the surrounding light rays and searches for the oscillating light. The selected light
sources are invisible to the human eye. Wavelengths are chosen so that the sensors are not
affected by the light in the environment, as the use of different wavelengths is allowed by
some sensors. Those are called directed color sensors to distinguish between colors. The
pulse mode of the selected wavelengths makes the optical sensors more reliable. Moreover,
all types of optical sensors work in the same simple manner and the differences are only in
the way that the light source and the optical receiver are classified (Santos and Farahi,
2014).
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There are many advantages to optical sensors (cameras) for drone detection, which
are listed below (Busset, 2015).
1- Provides visuals on the drone
2- High quality
3- Fast to record
4- Potential payload can record images as forensic evidence.
At the same time, there are many disadvantages of the optical sensors (cameras) for drone
detection (Müller, 2017).
1- Difficult to use for detection by itself
2- High false-alarm rates
3- Affected by surrounding factors.
4- Mostly poor performance in dark, fog, and other uncertain environments.
Radar

Figure 2.4 Radar, Techbriefs Media Group (2019)
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A radar is an electromagnetic sensor used for tracking, locating, and recognizing
various objects from far distances. The radar may be able to determine the size and shape
of these objects as well. Radar devices’ performance depend on the transmission of
electromagnetic energy towards specific targets, and on the monitoring of the echoes
returning from them. These targets can be aircraft, ships, spacecraft, cars, or birds. Radar
devices are distinguished by optical sensors and infrared devices in their ability to
accurately detect distant objects even in difficult weather conditions (Cook, 2012).
Radar systems use radio waves instead of sound waves because of their ability to
reach more distances and ability to perform the work even when the signal is weak. To
understand the way radar systems work, the radar detector can be used as an example.
Radar systems operate the device that launches high-frequency radio waves for a
microsecond period. Then the device that transmits the waves is closed, and the receiving
echo device is activated, as it measures the time taken for the echo to arrive. For example,
based on the radio wave speed, the distance to the plane can be measured accurately. In
the case of a special equipment, by adjusting the signals, the radar system can accurately
determine the aircraft speed (Skolnik, 2001). Below, several types of radars that differ
according to their use, are presented.
1- Marine radar devices: used to determine the direction of the ships, the distance
between them to avoid collision, and to locate them at sea based on fixed references
such as islands (Harman, 2008).
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2- Air radar devices: aircraft are equipped with radar equipment, in order to avoid
obstruction of their path, and to determine air altitude readings accurately (Wang,
et al., 2015).
3- Radar devices in missile guidance systems: used in military aircraft to determine
missile destinations (Manoogian, 1999).
4- Radar devices in biological research: used to track animal and bird migration
patterns. They are used in combination with weather radars to increase the accuracy
of weather forecasting (Rotkovska, et al., 1993).
There are many advantages of radar systems, some of which are outlined in the below
list (Baizert, et al., 2006).
1- Discovery of distant fixed objects moving from them, even if they are under the
surface of the earth.
2- Identification of objects by specifying their shape on the radar screen.
3- Identification of speed of objects.
4- Assistance in mapping accurate topographic maps of planets and moons.
5- Long range accuracy.
6- Constant tracking in the monitored environment.
7- Highly accurate localization of the tracked object.
8- Handling of hundreds of targets simultaneously.
9- Tracking all drones regardless of autonomous flight characteristics.
10- Mission carried out independent of visual conditions (day, night, fog, etc.).
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Drone Countermeasures Equipment
RF Jammers
Due to the rapid development of civilian drone in urban areas, many industries now
look at drones as an aid for several processes such as, enhance productivity, aerial
photography, geographical mapping, forest fire prevention, and agricultural pest control
(Desai, et al., 2015).
The outdoor low-flying aircraft defense system is a specialized interfering and
suppressing common drone used to counter malicious mission drones. The system shoots
down harmful drone, by using RF frequency and GPS signal. It uses dual control, remote
control signal and navigation signal, which makes the malicious drone unable to enter the
defense zone, outside the emergency landing zone (Desai, et al., 2015).
GPS Spoofers

Figure 2.5 GPS Spoofers, Ranganathan, A., et al. (1970)

GPS spoofers are systems used to jam the drones’ GPS signals making them unable
to receive data from ground control. They are advanced systems where the jamming is
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obtained with GPS systems on the system layer side, that carry the wrong information.
Spoofers are characterized by a medium cost, non-kinetic neutralization, and a short range,
which can affect other radio communications (McDowell, 2007).
High Power Microwave (HPM) Device
This high-power device is one of the systems used for current high-voltage
applications such as diode. These high-power devices are used in ships, unmanned aircraft,
power and railway stations, and large power sources that require very high-quality
products. When used for drone detection, the high-power microwave systems carry out
their mission with high reliability, so that the attacker drones can be stopped effectively
using non-kinetic neutralization.

Figure 2.6 HPM Device, Diehl Defence (2019)
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The drawback of these systems come from the risk of unintentionally disrupting
communications and their high cost. Also, the neutralized drone switches off instantly,
falling uncontrolled to the ground (Zhang, Zhong, and Luo, 2004).
Nets & Net Guns
Guns are weapons used during specific defend and attack scenarios. Poorly
designed or manufactured guns often can lead to unsuccessful missions. In the world of
gunsmithing, there are many memories of rifles that were especially bad, many of which
ending of the life of brave soldiers. The rapid pace of the development of firearms in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries successfully led to avoiding the repeat of manufacturing
errors, but the memories of these weapons, some of them with deadly consequences for
their owner, remained and their bad reputation continues (Dizard, et al., 1999).

Figure 2.7 Nets & Net Guns, McFadden, C. (2019)
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The net gun is a non-lethal weapon designed to fire shots from networks designed
to obstruct and foil target movement. It is used for drone detection, to sway away birds
from aircrafts, and, sometimes to save wild birds. The net gun system detects drone and
physically captures them, enhancing forensics and prosecution. They have a high accuracy
of mission success, a low risk of collateral damage, and exhibit a long range for the
deployed nets (White and Bartmann, 1994).
High-Energy Laser

Figure 2.8 High-Energy Laser, Kautilya (2020)

The military forces around the world desire to develop small, but highly effective,
laser weapon systems that can destroy enemy missiles and drones from a safe distance.
However, the current weapon systems that have been designed so far are large and heavy
and cannot be installed on motorized vehicles or combat aircraft. This prompted the major
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players in the defense industries to look into fiber laser weapons to find alternate solutions
(Apollonov, 2020)
Defense systems for manned and unmanned aircraft are experiencing
unprecedented stages of development, which requires an increasing need to achieve a rapid
and effective response to address these threats to aircraft of all kinds. High-power laser
weapons meet these requirements, and provide a solution to this challenge, because highpower liquid laser weapons systems provide the speed and power of light to meet multiple
threats. Laser weapons systems have additional offensive mission capabilities, as well as
precision targeting with low potential for side effects (Guisado-Pintado, Jackson, and
Rogers, 2019).
Birds of Prey

Figure 2.9 Birds of Prey, Krone (2017)
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Birds of prey are all birds that feed on prey, such as animals. They are scientifically
called Accipitriformes and are famous for their sharp vision and high speed, as well as their
flowing wings that help them fly quickly. They have large sizes and are characterized by
sharp beaks and strong claws that can tear the prey. There most known birds of prey are
eagles and falcons (Redpath and Thirgood, 1997).
These characteristics need to be mimicked in the design and development of drones
to obtain speed and accuracy in dealing with events, especially with a reduced risk of side
damage.
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Chapter 3
Proposed Drones Detection Systems
In the design and development of unmanned systems, there is always a needed
trade-off between drone detection and false alarm. In this thesis, our aim is to build an
optimal model for drone detection and neuralization. Hence, we propose two models, a
camera-based model and a combined camera and radar-based model. After defining the
models, we will study the probability of success for each of the two models. Then, a
comparison among the two models will be provided in order to select the one exhibiting
better characteristics.
Model 1: Camera Based Model
Figure 3.1 shows the first proposed model. This camera-based model has three main
components: Sensing, Detection, and Destroying. The first component is a camera with
night vision to record the scene. Then, any drones flying in the field of view will be detected
by a deep learning algorithm. The results will be sent to a decision-making tool to manage
the operation of the destroying system.
Unfortunately, Model 1 has some potential problems including lack of data, false
alarms, and the inability to detect bird-like drones. Note that a potential solution to lack of
data can use what is so-called augmentation or use the method proposed in Aker & Kalkan
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(2017). Our second proposed model is able to overcome the false alarms and inability to
detect bird-like drones.

Figure 3.1 Model 1: Camera Based Model

Risk Assessment

Figure Framework of the proposed method.

Each method has its own risks of either miss-detect a drone or give a false alarm.
Hence, this section investigates the risks associated with Model 1. Generally, weather
hazards, failure to cover required places, quality issues, vision blocking, and some of the
other risks can lead to miss detection of a malicious drone. However, the camera-based
Model 1 has some important advantages such as:


Ability to distinguish birds from drones



Ability to track malicious drone and do surveillance using machine learning



Ability to destroy a swarm of drones even though they are self-autonomous
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Camera Hazard
Hazard

Hazard causes

Hazard effects

Weather hazards (heavy
rain, snow, storm)

Nature

The image is not clear, or it
is not taken at all

Interference

Interference with
another object

Low battery

Charging problem

Small field of view

Not enough converge

Quality issues

Lens accuracy

Vision blocking

Human intervention

Getting the camera stolen
or lost

Human intervention

Camera does not work

Technical failure

Sensing component does
not work

Not able to detect drone

Not able to detect drone

Table 3.1 Camera Hazard

Deep Learning Hazard
Hazard

Hazard causes
Many hardware requirements

Expensive

Hazard effects

High cost

Experts (highly paid)
Lack of data
Bird-like drones
Miss detection

Drones have different characteristics

Drone reaches a
target

Drone and background are alike
Swarm of drones
Table 3.2 Deep Learning Hazard
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High Power Microwave Hazard
Hazard

Hazard causes

Hazard effects

Does not be in right
location

Problem in tracking drone

Did not go in the right time

Problem in decision
making

Drone will not be
destroyed or destroying
other things

Device does not work

Damaged, not connected to
power, or technical failure

High power microwave is
not connected to the system

Problem with software

Drone will not be
destroyed

Table 3.3 High Power Microwave Hazard

The likelihood of occurrence of the camera hazards, deep learning hazards, and
high-power microwave hazards causes of Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are obtained using the
rating levels described in Table 3.4. Similarly, the severity of the camera hazards, deep
learning hazards, and high-power microwave hazards effects of the same Tables 3.1, 3.2,
and 3.3 are obtained using the rating levels of Table 3.5. Both quantitative evaluations are
measured on a 1-10 scale.
Rating

Qualitative Evaluation

Quantitative Evaluation

A

Unlikely occurrence

1-2

B

Remote occurrence

3-4

C

Occasional occurrence

5-6

D

Repeated occurrence

7-8

E

Frequent occurrence

9-10

Table 3.4 Hazard Causes Evaluation Model
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Rating

Qualitative Evaluation

Quantitative Evaluation

I

No relevant effect on drone detection,
analysis, and neutralizing

1-2

II

Very minor effect on drone detection,
analysis, and neutralizing

3-4

III

Minor effect on drone detection,
analysis, and neutralizing

5-6

IV

Major effect on drone detection,
analysis, and neutralizing

7-8

V

Catastrophic effect on drone detection,
analysis, and neutralizing

9-10

Table 3.5 Hazard Effects Evaluation Model

The risk assessment is obtained by multiplying the likelihood of hazard causes with
the severity of hazard effects for each of the three categories of hazards: camera, deep
learning, and high-power microwave. The qualitative risk assessment is obtained using the
risk matrix of Table 3.6, while the quantitative risk assessment is obtained through
normalization of the quantitative results of risk, such that they can be measured on a 0-1
risk scale. The low risk cells in the Risk Assessment Matrix of Table 3.6 denote a low risk
of drone non-detection, incorrect analysis, and inability to neutralize the malicious drone.
Consequently, as the risk increases to moderate, high, and very high, it means that there is
an increased risk of non-detection, incorrect analysis, and inability to neutralize the
malicious drone.
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A

B

C

D

E

I

Low

Low

Low

Moderate

High

II

Low

Low

Moderate

High

High

III

Low

Moderate

Moderate

High

Very high

IV

Low

Moderate

High

Very high

Very high

V

Moderate

High

Very high

Very high

Very high

Table 3.6 Hazard Risk Assessment Matrix

In other words, if our proposed camera-based and camera and radar-based models
are successful in their missions, the mission risk assessment will be placed towards the
upper left corner. If our proposed camera-based and camera and radar-based models are
struggling in their missions, the mission risk assessment will be placed towards the lower
right corner, with almost certainty of mission failure given by the “very high” labels.
Since there are many unknown performance metrics that compose the hazard causes
and effects, an actual calculation of risk is not possible at the time of writing of this thesis.
Estimating the unknown values may be not accurate and could result in the assignment of
subjective risk assessment values.
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Model 2: Camera and Radar Based Model
Fig. 3.2 shows our proposed camera and radar-based model. This second model
includes also three main components: Sensing, Detection, and Destroying. The first
component is a camera with night vision to record the scene. Then, any drones flying in
the field of view are detected through the use of a deep learning algorithm. To reduce the
false alarms identified in Model 1, we propose to add a radar system in parallel with our
camera sensor. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the mechanisms of our second model, which has
an added radar as an extra sensor to our first component. It is expected that adding a radar
will reduce the false alarms, and hence significantly increase the probability of mission
success. Once a drone flying in the monitored environment is detected, then the proposed
system will identify it and it will be destroyed by our last component.

Figure 3.2 Model 2 Camera and Radar Based Model
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Algorithm 1: Decision Maker Algorithm
1. While sensing
2.

if {a drone is detected by DNN}

3.
4.

{Destroy}
elseif {a flying object is detected by Radar}

5.
6.

{Destroy}
elseif {a drone detected by DNN || Radar}

7.
8.

{Destroy}
end

9. end

Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is also performed for our camera and radar-based system, which
form our second model. Model 2 considers the radar hazard in addition to already defined
camera, deep learning, and high-power microwave hazards. As it can be seen from the
radar hazard components, inference or radar does not work instances and some of the other
risks can lead to drone non-detection.
It can be inferred that the camera and radar-based solution of Model 2 has the same
features of Model 1, but in addition it helps in increasing the chances of detection under
bad weather.
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Radar Hazard
Hazard

Hazard causes

Weather hazards (heavy
rain, snow, storm)

Nature

Interference

Other devices

Drone fly in low altitude

A drone designed to not be
detected by radar

Rader does not work

Damaged

Hazard effects

A drone cannot be detected

Technical fault

Table 3.7 Radar Hazard

The likelihood of occurrence of the camera, deep learning, and high-power
microwave hazards causes and effects of Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are obtained on the same
manner as above. Model 2 adds an extra evaluation for the radar hazard causes and effects
using the same models in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. The risk assessment of Model 2 is obtained
by multiplying the likelihood of hazard causes with the severity of hazard effects for each
of the four categories of hazards: camera, deep learning, high power microwave, and radar.
The qualitative risk assessment is obtained using the risk matrix of Table 3.6, while the
quantitative risk assessment is obtained through normalization of the quantitative results
of risk, such that they can be measured on a 0-1 risk scale.
Since there are many unknown performance metrics that compose the hazard causes
and effects for the four hazard categories, an actual calculation of risk is not currently
possible. Estimating the unknown values may be not accurate and could result in the
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assignment of subjective risk assessment values that could invalidate one or both of our
solution models.

Comparison
According to the rationale of the previous sections, an actual quantitative
comparison of the two models is not computed. From the qualitative evaluation
perspective, though, we can state that the second model that adds the radar sensor is more
performant for drone detection, analysis, and neutralizing (destroying) than the first model.
Many of the limitations of the first model, which can increase the risk of drone detection,
analysis, and neutralizing are reduced or potentially eliminated by the second model.
Therefore, for the same drone detection and neutralizing mission, the placement of Model
2 in the risk assessment matrix of Table 3.6 is most likely towards the upper left corner in
comparison with the placement of Model 1 in the same risk assessment matrix.
Generally, if our proposed camera-based and camera and radar-based models are
carrying out successfully their mission tasks, the mission risk assessment will be placed
towards the upper left corner in the matrix of Table 3.6. But, if our proposed camera-based
and camera and radar-based models are not carrying out their missions successfully, then
the mission risk assessment will be placed towards the lower right corner, with almost
certainty of mission failure given by the “very high” table cells.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion and Future Research

Conclusion
In this thesis, we have studied malicious unmanned aircraft systems that, if left
unchecked, may result in high risk, and can destroy vital assets. At the beginning of this
study, we presented different models of unmanned aircraft systems that were used in the
past. We also covered the solutions used for drone detection and destroying, along with
outlining the advantages and disadvantages of each of the studied sensor-type.
The main threat in defense activities lies in the difficulty of detecting malicious
drones. To address this threat, we proposed two counter-drone models based on smart
sensors. The first model, a camera-based model, utilizes the advantage of machine learning
for the detection step by using deep neural network modeling and decision-making. F
utilizes the advantage of machine learning for the detection step by using deep neural
network modeling and decision-making. or the second model, a camera and radar-based
model, we added a radar sensor to reduce the risks of miss-detection identified for the first
model. The second model also utilizes the advantage of machine learning for the detection
step by using deep neural network modeling and decision-making. After that, we proposed
a method to compare the mission risk assessment of the two models and inferred through
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qualitative evaluation that the second model would provide an increased mission
achievement evaluation in terms of malicious drone detection, correct parameter analysis,
and successful drone neutralization. Thus, the second model is expected to outperform the
first one in terms of drone detection and neutralizing efficiency.

Future Research
Future research can be performed on implementing the two models, which this
thesis could not cover. The difficulty of implementing these models comes from the high
cost, large sizes, and lack of an appropriate environment. It is possible in the future to
implement these systems practically and collect actual data to validate their effectiveness.
Another research direction could potentially look into adding another sensor to the system
or increase the effectiveness of the previous ones. The risk assessment analysis performed
in this thesis could be used for any future implementation or re-development research.
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